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FOREWORD
As mediation and mine action practitioners we live in very different worlds that 
only rarely coincide. In the field of mine action, we aspire to clear the land of 
explosive devices that pose a risk to human life. In the field of mediation, we 
search for ways out of armed conflicts that ravage in many parts of this world. 
However, despite our differences, we both dedicate our time and efforts to 
creating opportunities for people to live in peace and security. We are working 
towards similar objectives and our work is needed more than ever with the 
number of armed conflicts rising again after years of steady decline. With this in 
mind, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and 
the Swiss Peace Foundation (swisspeace) initiated a research project exploring 
the potential opportunities and challenges of a closer and mutually beneficial 
cooperation between peace mediation and mine action. 
In some instances, there are good reasons to keep the two communities of 
practice apart from one another, not least considering the humanitarian and 
political nature of our work. Today’s conflicts remind us of the risk humanitarian 
workers are incurring when they are perceived to serve a political purpose. 
However, there are many situations where exchange and collaboration are useful 
and indeed warranted. Colombia is a case in point, where the Government and 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) agreed in March 2015 to conduct a 
pilot project in humanitarian demining in order to strengthen confidence in the 
peace process. The recent rejection of the final agreements in the popular vote 
might be a setback in the overall process, but it does not undermine the value of 
the pilot project.
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Mediators and deminers can learn and benefit from one another. Peace mediation 
can take advantage of the technical expertise available within the mine action 
community, which is often required during negotiations in relation to areas 
contaminated by explosive hazards. Mine action can also serve as an entry point 
to peace processes by fostering confidence among conflicting parties. At the 
same time, mine action can be made more effective, efficient and sustainable 
when it is anchored in peace processes. Working in silos should belong to the 
past. This publication identifies areas of common interest that deminers and 
mediators need to pay attention to in order to make the best use of each other’s 
skills and knowledge.
Further work is needed and this paper is a first step towards an open and frank 
exchange between our two respective communities of practice, for the benefit of 
peace and security. 
Ambassador Stefano Toscano  Professor Laurent Goetschel 
GICHD Director    swisspeace Director
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ABSTRACT
The humanitarian consequences of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
are extensive and long lasting. This fact suggests the relevance of having them 
addressed in negotiations among conflict parties and included in ceasefire and 
peace agreements. Nevertheless, the link between mine action (also called 
humanitarian demining) and peace mediation is underexplored in practice and 
theory as is illustrated by the limited guidance and literature on the matter. This 
issue brief aims to explore to what extent the two communities of practice could 
overcome the tendency of working in isolation and benefit from one another. It 
also shows that mine action can indeed contribute to mediation, especially as an 
instrument for confidence building and part of broader arms control. Moreover, 
mediation can strengthen the case of mine action by anchoring the topic in peace 
agreements. 
These opportunities are however related to the challenge of linking mine action to 
the more politically-oriented agenda of peacemaking and peacebuilding. Notably, 
the traditional humanitarian focus that characterises mine action actors in the field, 
results in a desire to distance themselves from political engagement in general. 
Additionally, mediators are confronted with numerous issues to be included in 
their processes and risk overloading them with too many topics. In other words, 
there is a reluctance to predetermine what needs to be discussed at the outset 
of a mediation process. The authors believe that all those concerns may well 
be moderated by facilitating a better mutual understanding and a more direct 
engagement between the two fields. 
Overall, the study conducted for this issue brief leads to four main 
recommendations. 
 • First, mine action is a topic that should be addressed in peace mediation 
one way or another. This is to say, mediators should consider it as a 
possible issue for discussion. Whether this entails its formal inclusion in a 
ceasefire or peace agreement should be decided on a case by case basis. 
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 • Second, it is important to clearly distinguish mine action before and 
after an agreement because this has a significant impact on its goal and 
operational scope. Mine action activities before an agreement are primarily 
used as entry points for peace processes or as confidence building 
measures. As such, they are primarily part of a larger mediation strategy 
and serve a humanitarian purpose to a limited extent. The latter point takes 
centre stage when mine action is conducted after an agreement, i.e. as 
part of its content. 
 • Third, mine action provisions in an agreement should be restricted to basic 
questions due to the limited knowledge and expertise available during 
negotiations.  As accurate and detailed information will be sparse, it is 
most useful to merely clarify fundamental elements of mine action as well 
as respective responsibilities when it comes to the implementation of 
activities and build on those commitments moving forward. 
 • Fourth, there is the need to build relationships between the two 
communities of practice, which appear to operate in silos and have scarce 
knowledge of the respective fields of activities. In order to be in a position 
to benefit from each other, practitioners should maintain at least some 
form of interaction. 
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INTRODUCTION
This issue brief explores to what extent practitioners working in the fields of 
peace mediation and mine action could benefit from one another’s experience and 
expertise. It builds on the premise that there are currently only limited contacts 
between these two communities of practice, despite the fact that there are 
numerous potential interlinkages. Hence, the authors look into possible reasons 
behind this, assess areas where a closer cooperation may prove useful and 
formulate some recommendations on how to facilitate a better understanding 
between experts of mine action and peace mediation. 
Although perhaps not always prominently reflected in news coverage of 
contemporary violent conflicts, mine action remains to be a topic of great 
relevance. Despite long-running efforts to reach a world free of mines, such 
weapons, including cluster munitions (CM) and ERW1, continue to be a 
considerable problem in many conflict-affected countries. Currently, it is not 
possible to provide an accurate estimate of the total contaminated ground,2 but 
the scale of the problem is well known. The Landmine Monitor 2015 published 
by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)3 says that 57 states and 
4 areas in the world are affected by anti-personnel mines (APM).4 Moreover, the 
number of victims of APM and ERW reached 3,678 in 2014.5 When it comes to 
CM, the ICBL Cluster Munitions Monitor 2015 reports that the contamination 
affects 22 countries and 3 other areas and from 2012 to 2014 at least 1,968 victims 
were recorded in 13 countries and 92 per cent of them were civilians.6 
Mines/ERW harm civilians indiscriminately not only during conflict, but also 
years after reaching a settlement. Beyond the direct threat to physical security, 
the contamination by mines/ERW has a severe impact on post-conflict recovery 
and socio-economic development. In the immediate aftermath of a conflict, 
contamination creates an obstacle for the return of refugees and internally 
1 In the text, we use the  expression mines/ERW to refer to all these weapons. Victim operated 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are also considered when they are ERW.
2 GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, Geneva, GICHD, 2014, p. 21.
3 The ICBL is a global network of non-governmental organizations working for the elimination of anti-
personnel mines and it produces annual reports on the contamination around the world. See http://icbl.
org/en-gb/about-us.aspx (accessed 26 November 2015).
4 ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2015, pp. 2, 18. http://www.the-monitor.org/media/2152583/Landmine-
Monitor-2015_finalpdf.pdf (accessed 26 November 2015).
5 Ibid., p. 25. 
6 ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2015, pp. 1, 3. http://the-monitor.org/media/2135498/2015_
ClusterMunitionMonitor.pdf (accessed 26 November 2015)
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displaced people (IDP). In both the medium-term and long-term, mines/ERW 
block the development of infrastructure; limit the access to health care, education 
and other social services. They also impede the use of assets for sustainable 
livelihood such as water sources, land, etc, and deter investments for economic 
development.7 
It would thus appear plausible that the effects of mines/ERW would come up 
regularly in mediation processes, understood in this issue brief as “a process 
whereby a third party assists two or more parties, with their consent, to prevent, 
manage or resolve a conflict by helping them to develop mutually acceptable 
agreements”.8 The connection seems imperative all the more so as a large part 
of conflicts that have come to an end over the last 30 years involved mediation, 
making it one of the predominant tools used for the peaceful resolution of 
conflict.9 
Furthermore, the objectives pursued in mediation processes point to the 
importance of issues related to mines/ERW. For instance, in its Guidance for 
Effective Mediation, the United Nations (UN) holds that “peace agreements 
should end violence and provide a platform to achieve a sustainable peace, justice, 
security and reconciliation”.10 Even when a comprehensive agreement is not 
feasible, negotiations that merely aim to contain violence, for example ceasefire 
negotiations, need to address the major instruments used in violent conflict. In 
both cases, the question of mines/ERW would seem to be relevant. 
The importance of this connection is demonstrated by two of the most 
prominent current peace processes, where mine action has been either 
undertaken or discussed before the signature of a final peace agreement. The 
first case is Colombia, where, in the framework of their peace negotiations, 
the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo – FARC-EP) issued a 
joint statement on 7 March 201511 in which they agreed to conduct survey and 
7 GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, op. cit., p. 201.
8 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, New, York, UN, 2012, p.4.
9 According to the School of Culture of Peace in Barcelona, out of the 59 conflicts that have come to 
an end in the last 30 years, 74,6 per cent were achieved through peace agreements. Additionally, the 
school’s yearbook of peace processes notes that in 79,4 per cent of negotiations, external mediation 
was used to facilitate the process. See: Vicenç Fisas, 2015 Yearbook of Peace Processes, Barcelona, 
School of Culture of Peace, 2015, p.9.
10 United Nations, Guidance for Effective Mediation, op. cit, p.20. 
11 https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/comunicados/comunicado-conjunto-52-la-habana-7-de-
marzo-de-2015 , (accessed 19 October 2016).
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clearance of mines/ERW with the aim to build confidence and increase security 
for the population. The second case is Myanmar,12 where a peace process started 
in August 2011. In October 2015, the government and some of the armed groups 
signed a ceasefire agreement including a commitment to stop using mines.13
Against this backdrop, this issue brief explores the links and the potential 
synergies that mine action and mediation have. It is organised in three parts. The 
first part establishes a connection between mine action and mediation by focusing 
on the existing literature and by reviewing ceasefire and peace agreements 
containing humanitarian demining measures. This first part builds the baseline for 
this research, seeking to understand how these two fields have interacted and 
how this has been discussed among experts and practitioners. The second part 
focuses on identifying practical challenges and opportunities in linking the two 
fields and relies on the insights gathered from seven interviews with experienced 
practitioners, including senior mediators and representatives of the mine action 
community. The conclusion in the third part summarises the findings and presents 
some recommendations on possible ways forward to better understand the 
interaction between mine action and mediation. More importantly, it provides 
practical measures to foster interaction and mutual understanding between the 
two communities.
12 swisspeace, “Myanmar at a Crossroads”, Newsletter, no. 142, November 2015. International Crisis 
Group, “Myanmar’s Peace Process: A Nationwide Ceasefire Remains Elusive”, Crisis Group Asia 
Briefing, no. 146, 16 September 2005.
13 The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Union of 
Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organizations, 15 October 2015, para 5.e. http://peacemaker.un.org/
sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/NCA-Final-Text.pdf (accessed 18 March 2016). 
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PART I: UNPACKING MINE 
ACTION AND MEDIATION
This part seeks to establish a reference by showing how mine action and 
mediation have so far been connected in theory and practice. As a preliminary 
remark, it is worth noting that the literature on this matter is rather limited and 
mainly discusses mine action in the framework of overall peacemaking and 
peacebuilding if at all. This part also contains an analysis of signed ceasefire and 
peace agreements in order to identify the frequency and the content of mine 
action provisions in such agreements. Thus, it not only aims at quantifying the 
number of agreements containing provisions on mine action, but also at providing 
an understanding of the provisions themselves.
MINE ACTION IN PEACEMAKING AND PEACEBUILDING
In terms of appropriate measures to deal with mines/ERW the international 
community has developed robust responses in the form of mine action, which 
will also be used as a reference point in this issue brief. Mine action is defined as 
“activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact 
of mines and ERW including unexploded sub-munitions.”14 Thus, mine action 
does not involve demining only, but it actually addresses the consequences that 
mines/ERW have on populations in order to improve their security and 
opportunities for socio-economic development. As such, it needs to be clearly 
distinguished from military demining, which merely implies the clearance of 
strategically and tactically important areas in a military context. The standard 
definition of mine action as used in this issue brief includes five pillars:15
 • Mine/ERW risk education
 • Demining, i.e. mine/ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance
 • Victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration
 • Stockpile destruction
 • Advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions
14 This definition is taken from the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). UNMAS, IMAS 04.10: 
Glossary of mine action definitions and abbreviations, 2014, al. 3.176, pp. 24-25. See: http://www.
mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/MAS/documents/imas-international-standards/english/series-04/
IMAS_04.10_Glossary_of_mine_action_terms__definitions_and_abbreviations.pdf (accessed 26 
November 2015).
15 GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, op. cit., p. 27.
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Mine action is a humanitarian activity and there is no specific principle restricting 
its activities to conflict or post-conflict environments (see table 1). Thus, mine 
action is connected with peacemaking (generally corresponding to sections of 
conflict and stabilisation in the table), peacebuilding (priority reconstruction and 
assisted development) and development processes. Mediation is primarily used in 
peacemaking and to some extent in peacebuilding.
Table 1
Source: GICHD, A Guide to Mine Action, Geneva, GICHD, 2014, p. 37.
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PEACEMAKING
With regard to peacemaking, mine action is particularly difficult in the context of 
an active conflict because humanitarian demining requires access to contaminated 
areas and a reasonably stable and secure situation that allows conducting 
operations, which usually demand a significant amount of time, staff and logistic 
capacities. For these reasons, the most common operational environment is 
a post-conflict one. However, the literature shows that there are cases of mine 
action in conflict contexts and reasons in favour of this practice.
A workshop organised by the international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs) Geneva Call and ICBL in 2005 addressed this topic and produced some 
recommendations based on the experience gathered in Colombia, Sudan and Sri 
Lanka. Participants emphasised that even though mine action is possible while 
a conflict is still ongoing; it must be conducted for strictly humanitarian reasons. 
Furthermore, mine action should be depoliticised as political considerations would 
negatively affect operations. These conclusions reflect a strong humanitarian 
perspective with a focus on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and 
independence and have no explicit link to negotiating efforts yet. 
The UN argues that there is a need to formally include mine action into 
peacemaking, as the guidelines developed by its Inter-Agency Coordination Group 
on Mine Action (IACG-MA) in 200316 provide governments, organisations and 
individuals with key technical questions that need to be addressed in ceasefire 
and peace agreements. In particular, the guidelines point out that in difficult 
cases there is a tendency to include mine action only in vague terms, generating 
excessive expectations and without establishing the required mechanisms to 
implement mine action programmes. In order to counter this trend, they request 
the proper consideration of technical needs for mine action operations.
These guidelines largely reflect the obligations contained in the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and provide an accurate description of the 
technical needs for mine action. Their limitation however lies in the fact that 
they lack a mediation perspective and thus do not take into account the specific 
challenges and opportunities of discussing mine action in the negotiations 
for ceasefire and peace agreements. In other words, the guidelines omit the 
problems that mediators may face in discussing mine action with conflict parties.
16 The guideline is based on the recognition that there is little reference to mine action in agreements, 
although it is important for the return of IDPs and refugees, the provision of humanitarian aid and 
development. (UNMAS), Lignes Directrices pour l’Action Contre les Mines dans le Cadre d’Accords 
de Cessez-le-feu et d’Accords de Paix, p. 1. http://www.bibliomines.org/fileadmin/tx_bibliodocs/
MineActionGuidelinesforCeasefireandPeaceAgreements.pdf (accessed 26 November 2015).
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Addressing the issue from a mediation perspective, a study by the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) also supports the principle of integrating mine action 
as a topic for negotiations and seeks to provide further guidance for conflict parties 
and mediators, which for the moment is still limited.17 The authors state that the 
issue of mines/ERW can provide an entry-point for engaging with parties to the 
conflict, contribute to building confidence and ultimately they argue that it can 
begin before the signature of a peace agreement. The fundamental reason of this 
opportunity lies in the fact that mine action “provides a potentially neutral platform 
from which parties can agree to meaningful measures, and further engage.”18 
However, the HD study also raises some concerns when linking mine action to 
mediation efforts. It points out the case of frozen conflicts, in which it may actually 
be better to disconnect mine action from peace processes that are blocked. This 
has been the case for the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh where the co-chairs of the 
Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
deliberately did not include mine action into the formal mediation process. They 
did not want to make mine action contingent on overall progress in the peace 
process, a decision that today is considered a “blessing”19 as the conflict itself has 
been protracted for years. In such cases, it is better to conduct mine action as a 
neutral and technical issue to engage with armed groups. This is often done by 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which conduct humanitarian demining 
without the risk of diplomatic or political fallout.20 Another risk of mine action in 
conflict contexts is that it can “reinforce conflict dynamics and undermine 
peacemaking efforts” if it is not addressed properly and according to the specific 
features of the context (see box 1).21 
PEACEBUILDING
With regard to peacebuilding, the linkage is more obvious as mine action takes 
place mostly in post-conflict contexts and is often associated with socio-economic 
recovery and development, despite its origin as an emergency response. In this 
context, mine action usually involves the establishment of national mine action 
programmes and support for reconstruction projects,22 which address broader 
issues, including for instance access to health care, education and other basic 
services.
17 LeBrun, Emile, Damman Suzanne, “Addressing explosive ordnance in peace processes”, Briefing paper, 
no. 2, 2009, p. 5.
18 Ibid., p. 12.
19 Ibid., p. 8.
20 Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey: “The Struggle Against Landmines: An Opening for Peace Talks in Colombia”, 
Accord 16, 2005, p.4.
21 LeBrun, Emile, Damman Suzanne, “Addressing explosive ordnance in peace processes”, op. cit., 2009, 
p. 11.
22 GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, op. cit., pp. 198-201.
Box 1: Senegal
Senegal is affected by contamination of APM, anti-vehicle mines (AVM) and ERW. 
The contamination is due to the conflict between the Government of Senegal and 
the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) and is concentrated 
in the Casamance region. The Senegalese National Mine Action Centre (CNAMS), 
which was established in 2006, coordinates demining operations in Casamance. 
A number of NGOs and commercial operators were active and this allowed 
clearance to progress. In 2013, operations approached MFDC controlled-areas and 
MFDC leaders publicly called for a halt in demining operations. In particular, during 
a direct dialogue in early 2013 between the MFDC and the CNAMS, facilitated 
by Geneva Call and a local NGO, MFDC stated that CNAMS had reached a 
limit beyond which demining operations constituted a threat to their security 
and therefore could put deminers at risk1. However, demining continued, and 
subsequently 12 South African deminers working for the company Mechem were 
taken hostage on 3 May 2013 and the Government ordered a halt to all survey 
and clearance activities until November 2013.2 More broadly, this event marked 
a rupture in the positive reconciliation between the parties. The Senegalese case 
illustrates the risk of mine action being perceived as a political, strategic or military 
activity and potentially doing harm to the overall peace process. It also underlines 
the importance of constant information exchange between different levels of 
demining activities.
1 RFI Afrique, «Sénégal : seule la paix permettra de parachever le déminage en Casamance», 7 April 
2013. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130407-senegal-casamance-mines-cnams-handicap-international-
mechem  (accessed 15 December 2015).
2 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Senegal. Mine Action”, http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.
php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3836 (accessed 15 December 2015).
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Nevertheless, the literature shows that such linkages are not immediate either 
and mine action is often conducted separately from other components of 
peacebuilding processes. Against this background, Harpviken and Roberts say that 
mine action can have a “major impact on peace building”23 despite its technical 
nature, because the respective activities can influence key political issues relevant 
for peacebuilding. 
23 Harpviken, Kristian Berg; Roberts, Rebecca: “Introduction”, in Harpviken, Kristian Berg; Roberts, 
Rebecca (ed.): “Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in support of Peacebuilding”, PRIO 
Report, no. 2, 2004, p.1. See also Harpviken, Kristian Berg; Skåra, Brent A.: “Humanitarian mine action 
and peace building: exploring the relationship”, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 5, 2003, pp. 809-822.
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mechem  (accessed 15 December 2015).
2 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Senegal. Mine Action”, http://archives.the-monitor.org/index.
php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3836 (accessed 15 December 2015).
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The contribution to peacebuilding is not free from challenges either, even though 
they may not be as acute as in contexts of active conflict. In fact, in the immediate 
post-conflict period, security and confidence are still low and peacebuilding needs 
to address the root causes. Thus, mine action’s strictly humanitarian goal may 
actually clash with more political peacebuilding priorities. On this matter, according 
to Harpviken and Roberts, mine action has to integrate a careful conflict analysis 
and be more flexible in terms of priority-setting in order to adapt to the politically 
sensitive issues in the peacebuilding agenda.24 In other words, to contribute 
effectively to peacebuilding, mine action has to adjust its operations to the 
requirements and the priorities of peacebuilding.
FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE REVIEW
The review of the current debates on the linkage between mine action, 
peacemaking and peacebuilding shows that mine action can be a constructive 
factor in establishing and implementing a peace process. However, the linkage 
is not problem free since mine action and the promotion of peace have different 
goals and requirements. These differences should be taken into account, 
otherwise mine action could be detrimental to peace efforts. Four points stand 
out from this review:
1. Mine action can take place in conflict contexts; this however does not equate 
to a contribution to peace mediation because it may represent a traditional 
humanitarian intervention focused on addressing people’s immediate needs. 
2. Politicisation is a major risk of connecting mine action with peacemaking 
and peacebuilding.25 Undoubtedly, this is the greatest challenge to overcome 
because using mine action as a stepping stone for an overarching political 
objective and strategy bears the risk of running against the humanitarian 
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. 
3. Despite these risks, mine action provides an entry-point to engage with 
conflict parties as it is a technical and thus relatively neutral platform for 
working with them and offers the opportunity of small scale confidence 
building that is not part of the main negotiations. 
24 Harpviken, Kristian Berg, Roberts, Rebecca, “Introduction”, in Harpviken, Kristian Berg, Roberts, 
Rebecca, (ed. by) “Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in support of Peacebuilding,” op. cit.,p. 
57-60.
25 Ibid., p. 26.
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4. The connection of mine action with peacemaking and peacebuilding requires 
flexibility with respect to the criteria used in deciding for the operations. 
Priorities must go beyond humanitarian demining needs and also take into 
account political considerations.
REVIEW OF CEASEFIRE AND PEACE AGREEMENTS
A research in the UN Peacemaker database26 shows that using key words27 related 
to mine action yields a list of 35 agreements that contain meaningful references 
to clearance of mines/ERW. 
Concerning the temporal distribution of agreements (see table 2); the dataset 
analysed shows that mine action has been included in agreements on a regular 
basis after the end of the Cold War. In fact, out of the 35 agreements, 30 were 
signed after 1989, which corresponds to 85,7 per cent of the total number. 
This result may imply that the increasing relevance of humanitarian demining is 
connected with the growth of intra-state and civilian conflicts in the post-Cold War 
period and matches the history of mine action which emerged in the late 80s with 
the first UN appeal for funding and the creation of the first humanitarian demining 
NGOs.28  
The analysis of the demining measures included in the agreements before 
1989 shows that the signatories committed to conducting demining, marking 
minefields, providing reports and sharing information on mines/ERW. Overall, 
in these agreements demining is rather executed as part of the military 
redeployment of forces because it is focused on clearance of defensive measures 
put in place during the conflict. Thus, these agreements do not reflect a specific 
humanitarian perspective, meaning the elimination of the threat to civilian 
population and activities. 
26 http://peacemaker.un.org/. The UN peacemaker database contained 807 agreements on 9 December 
2015.  
27 Key words: landmines, mines, mortars, minefields, demining, mine clearance, arms, disarmament, 
weapons, explosives, stockpile, stockpile destruction, weapons storage, ammunition, advocacy, 
humanitarian, mine risk education, victim assistance.
28 GICHD, Guide to Mine Action, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
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After 1989, the agreements show a larger spectrum of measures (see table 3). 
These activities reflect the specific humanitarian nature of mine action, such 
as mine risk education (MRE), but they also reflect the broadening of tasks 
conducted by mine action actors, which is also demonstrated by the link with 
storage of weapons and disarmament. 
These agreements do not simply ask signatories to stop laying mines and using 
other explosive devices, but they actually demand the removal of the threat posed 
by such weapons in order to reduce and eliminate the risks to the population.
Table 2 - Distribution of agreements over time1
1 Table 2 and 3 were compiled by the GICHD and swisspeace and are based on the annex 3.
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Table 3 - Topics in agreements1
1 Table 2 and 3 were compiled by the GICHD and swisspeace and are based on the annex 3.
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A closer look at the agreements shows several trends:
1. Humanitarian focus: Some agreements emphasise the humanitarian nature 
of demining by explicitly requesting clearance not only in military areas, but 
also in the entire country, for the benefit of the whole population and for 
specific groups that have been particularly affected by the conflict.29 Another 
humanitarian concern is establishing conditions conducive to post-conflict 
recovery and development.30 Some agreements also stress the humanitarian 
nature of demining by referring explicitly to the international conventions or 
commitments against mines/ERW.31 
2. Involvement of international actors: In addition to humanitarian and 
development imperatives, the presence of an international peace mission 
is another aspect often linked to the inclusion of mine action in peace 
agreements. A number of agreements state that such missions have 
the responsibility to clear contaminated areas or to demand and monitor 
demining operations.32 Other agreements also refer to the role of UN 
peacekeeping missions and other UN agencies, as was the case in Sudan, for 
example.33  
29 This perspective is illustrated by the Lusaka Protocol (1994) that says demining is conducted “for 
the good of all Angolans”: Lusaka Protocol, Annex 8, point 1.34. Similarly, the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement (2000) requires the parties to “ensure demining over the whole country”: 
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, Art. 26, al. vi. Other agreements refer directly 
to the need to secure the return of displaced people. This is the case of the Paris Agreement (1991), 
which puts an end to 20 years of conflict in Cambodia and states the requirement of “clearing of 
mines from repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas, as well as in the protection 
of the reception centres”: Paris Agreement, 23 October 1991, Annex 2, Art. XIII.
30 See the Zinguinchor Peace Agreement in Senegal (2004), which requires parties to conduct “humane 
clearance from Casamance in order to facilitate the resumption of the economic activities”: 
Zinguinchor Peace Agreement between the Government of Senegal and the Movement of the 
Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), 2004, Art. 4, al. 1.
31 This is the case of the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in 
the Great Lakes Region in which the Parties commit “to promote common policies to put an end to 
the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons, as well as APM” and also to “apply the Ottawa 
convention on APM”: Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, Point 22 and 64.
32 For instance, the Dayton Agreement (1995) states that parties agree that the tasks of the 
Implementation Force (IFOR) call to “monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles”: General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. ‘Dayton Agreement’), 21 November 
1995, Art. VI al. 3.e. In the case of the Kosovo war, the Rambouillet Accord (1999) also includes the 
parties’ agreement that the Kosovo Force (KFOR) has the right “to require the Parties to mark and 
clear minefields and obstacles and to monitor their performance”: Rambouillet Accord, 23 February 
1999, Ch. 7, Art. VIII al. 2.e.
33 The Agreement on the Permanent Ceasefire in Sudan of 2004 says that Parties “shall conduct 
demining activities as soon as possible and in coordination with the UN Peace Support Mission with a 
view to create the conditions necessary for deployment of the UN Peace Support mission“. 
In addition, the UN mission has to “assist Parties’ demining efforts by providing technical advice 
and coordination”: Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation 
modalities during the Pre-Interim and the Interim Periods between the Government of Sudan and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, Points 8.6.4 - 8.6.6.
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Another important aspect that creates a link with international peace 
missions is the establishment of joint bodies because they include the 
presence of international representatives. This can take the form of joint 
monitoring commissions, joint military committees or joint operational teams 
to conduct monitoring. 34  
3. Link to traditional mine action: Activities that are either listed in the five pillars 
defining mine action or are considered indispensable for the operations are 
often included. This is the case of measures regarding survey, reporting 
of mines/ERW, in addition to the exchange of information, which consists 
mostly of the provision of minefield maps, description of the type of  
mines/ERW and their location. For instance, the Dayton Agreement states 
that “each Party shall furnish to the Joint Military Commission information 
regarding the positions and descriptions of all known unexploded ordnance, 
explosive devices, demolitions, minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements, 
and all other physical or military hazards to the safe movement of personnel 
within Bosnia and Herzegovina”.35 Another example is the Agreement on the 
Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Guatemala (1996), in which it is 
stated that “both the Guatemalan armed forces and URNG are to provide the 
United Nations with detailed information on explosives, mines and existing 
minefields.”36 Associated with the exchange of information, there is often the 
requirement of marking dangerous areas. 
34 Examples are: Lomé Peace Agreement, Art. II al. 2.; Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security 
Arrangements Implementation modalities during the Pre-Interim and the Interim Periods between the 
Government of  Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, points 8.6.2. and 14.6.3.1; 
Nepal: Agreement on Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies, Point 6.1.1.
35 Dayton Agreement, Art.  V. The Joint Military Commission is defined in the article VIII and is a body 
that processes “military complaints, questions or problems”, assists the commander of (IFOR), who is 
also the chair of the commission. In the context of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the sharing of 
information is also requested in the Ceasefire Agreement in Croatia for deploying the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994, Annex B al. 1) and in the 
Rambouillet Accord for the deployment of KFO, (Chapter 7, Art. VII al.d).
36 Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements, 
29 December 1996, Point 13. The URNG is the armed group Unitad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca.
Part I: Unpacking mine action and mediation22
4. Additional support: A fourth finding is that some agreements reaffirm the 
parties’ commitment to seek additional support and assistance for conducting 
humanitarian demining. This reflects article 6 on international cooperation and 
assistance in the APMBC and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) 
and also the awareness of the specific expertise and capabilities required for 
these operations, which are not to be confused with military demining, and 
the long duration of humanitarian demining operations. This point is illustrated 
by the Lusaka Protocol that says the signatories “should seek help from 
the UN and specialised institutions to assist them in carrying out demining 
operations”.37 
5. Disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation (DDR) and security sector 
reform (SSR): Some agreements connect mine action with the broader topic 
of disarmament, storage and monitoring of arms. These activities are not 
traditionally part of mine action, but increasingly undertaken by mine action 
actors, who thereby contribute to larger processes of demilitarisation that 
take place through DDR and SSR.  
 
A significant example of this pattern is again the Agreement on the 
Implementation of the Peace Agreements in Guatemala in 1996, where the 
parties’ commitment to provide information on mines/ERW is part of the list 
including the number of troops, inventory of weapons and military equipment 
possessed or stored by the URNG.38 This agreement also includes the 
timeline for the gathering of troops, collection and storing of weapons and 
equipment in “warehouses designated by the UN”.39
6. Components rarely mentioned: In the agreements there are some 
components of traditional mine action that have received limited attention. 
This is the case for MRE and VA.
The analysis of the agreements provides an initial picture on how mine action 
is included in mediation. The six points above can be considered as lessons 
learned that can be drawn from the agreements concluded in the past. In order to 
complete the picture, the second part of this study is dedicated to the analysis of 
the experience gathered by practitioners.
37 Lusaka Protocol, Annex 8, Point 1.34.
38 Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements, 
Point 46.
39 Ibid., Point 53.
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PART II: LINKING MINE 
ACTION AND MEDIATION
To establish practical connections, interviews with experts from the field of mine 
action and mediation were conducted.40 The interviews revealed two distinct 
ways to link mine action and mediation. On the one hand, mine action is used 
as an instrument in mediation to advance the process. On the other hand, it can 
be introduced into the content to be discussed within a mediation process and 
eventually included in an agreement. This part of the issue brief is divided into 
three sections. A discussion of the potential of linking mine action and mediation 
is followed by an analysis of the two mentioned ways to do so.
MINE ACTION IN MEDIATION: PROS AND CONS 
Overall, interviewed experts agreed that especially in intra-state conflicts, 
mines/ERW are an important issue. As the “weapon of the poor”, they are used 
frequently by both non-state actors, and also by states. Due to the very low price 
and easy access, mines are popular for their “cost-efficiency”. Interviewees also 
saw IEDs in the range of weapons to be addressed in a disarmament process. 
ERW are part of the problem as well because they are used for making IEDs.  
Given this strategic and tactical importance of mines/ERW for many conflict 
parties, mediators regularly face heavy reluctance when it comes to giving up 
the use of such  explosive devices, although depending on the context there 
are exceptions41. In addition, some interviewees pointed out that openly talking 
about mines/ERW may bring about reputational damage. Most conflict parties are 
acutely aware of the damage mines/ERW inflict on local populations and are very 
sensitive to being portrayed as the ones responsible for this suffering. 
Several experts made no distinction between mines/ERW and machine guns 
or rifles, arguing that they should in fact be dealt with within the framework of 
disarmament, an issue that comes up in every ceasefire or peace negotiation. 
They argued that storing and destroying existing stocks of mines/ERW should 
naturally be linked to broader arms control efforts. Against this backdrop, the 
40 Seven semi-structured interviews of 30-60 minutes were conducted. The list of questions is attached 
in Annex 2.
41 Since mines/ERW are a static weapon, they are not overly useful to forces that move around within a 
given territory, for instance. 
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interviewed experts unanimously acknowledged that addressing the issue of 
mines/ERW inevitably raises political questions, be they related to security 
concerns or matters of perception by the civilian population, that need to be dealt 
with in the framework of a larger peace process. To some extent, this stands in 
contrast to arguments for the depoliticisation of mine action found in the literature. 
While there was an agreement that addressing mine action within a peace 
process requires a high degree of trust and thus awareness of political 
sensitivities, opinions diverged slightly when it comes to deciding whether mine 
action issues should be discussed in the mediation process, for example in the 
formal negotiations itself. Some do have a preference to tackle these issues 
separately and the reason provided for this was that if linked, any progress made 
related to the issue of mines/ERW would be subject to a successful conclusion 
of a mediation process. This argument is backed up by the above-mentioned 
example of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict42, which speaks in favour of a separate 
negotiation track dealing with mines/ERW issues. This separate approach may 
have the advantage of ‘keeping a process alive’ if the main negotiations are 
blocked. Western Sahara is another example where the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS) maintains a mine action programme43 supporting 
stabilisation while the official mediation process has been all but stuck in recent 
years.
In spite of these advantages, most interviewees advocated for the formal 
inclusion of mine action in mediation processes. The main argument for this 
position was content-related, stating that once a peace agreement is signed and 
implementation starts, that document becomes the main reference for all further 
activities. In other words, many interviewees underlined that it would be difficult 
to draw attention to mine action if these issues are not included in a peace or 
ceasefire agreement. Hence, they concluded it was the responsibility of the 
mediation team to at least raise the topic with conflict parties. 
This in turn brings up further questions about how to do so. One recurrent 
challenge that was mentioned in almost all interviews – and which also figures 
prominently in the literature – is the lack of knowledge on all sides (including the 
conflict parties but often also third parties facilitating peace talks) of what mine 
action really is. This means that mediators have a role to play identifying those 
knowledge gaps, raising awareness and preparing the ground for long-term 
activities, which often involves the consultation of thematic experts. 
42 On this case, we should say that even though humanitarian demining has made progress, the lack of a 
peace agreement is a fundamental obstacle to clear the region completely as the front lines are kept. 
HALO Trust conduct demining but not directly on the line of contact. 
43 See: http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/westernsahara (accessed 03 October 2016).
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MINE ACTION AS A STEPPING STONE 
FOR A MEDIATION PROCESS
It is often argued that mine action can be a useful confidence-building measure 
(CBM), especially in prolonged conflicts. When the trust between conflict 
parties is very low, it may be constructive to define certain areas of a territory 
and start joint demining operations on a low scale. The objective of such activities 
is to have parties work together on a common goal with the hope that this will 
create a positive experience in which enemy forces have contact with each 
other, cooperate and remain unharmed. This experience is then hoped to have a 
stimulating effect on the peace process. The agreement of March 2015 between 
the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP to start demining activities in the 
Department of Antioquia is a good illustration of this logic. The initiative itself is 
too small to have a physical impact on a national level. However, the main goal 
is the symbolic effect of seeing members of the armed forces and the guerrilla 
working for a common cause. This in turn may prepare the ground for more 
comprehensive cooperation in this particular field. Meanwhile, the agreement also 
aimed to reinforce the confidence of the two parties in the peace process at large. 
Besides the parties directly involved in a conflict, mine action also requires 
the communities to be taken into account. Depending on the context, civilian 
populations may be sceptical towards a peace process and sensitive to the issue 
of mines/ERW due to the damage inflicted on them. Therefore, CBMs may also 
be directed towards the population, creating a concrete benefit as a result of the 
peace process and demonstrating the commitment of the conflict parties to end 
the conflict. This can therefore play a significant role in the strategy of a mediator 
when designing a process. Again, Colombia serves as an example. Given the 
long duration of the conflict and the failed attempts to resolve it in the past, the 
population’s belief in the current peace process was very limited in the beginning. 
Seeing that the negotiations produced only little tangible benefits, having the 
conflict parties sharing responsibilities in mine action had certainly contributed 
to increase the Colombian population’s confidence in the peace negotiations.44 
Thus, notwithstanding the positive physical impact a small demining initiative may 
have on the ground, the main objective of activities of this nature is to keep a 
process moving or to get closer to a breakthrough in the negotiations. Mine action 
at this stage is rarely an end in itself but rather a tool to be used carefully and in a 
coordinated fashion in support of overarching peacemaking goals. 
44 For an in-depth analysis of how popular support to the peace process in Colombia has changed over 
time, see “Movilización por la Paz en Colombia: una infrestructura social clave para el posacuerdo”. 
CINEP, March 2016. Accessed on 17 March 2016 at http://www.cinep.org.co/images/iniciativas_paz/
Informe_Datapaz_2.pdf.
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Mine action can also serve as an entry point to start a dialogue with conflict 
parties. As a topic of concern to the wider population, it may be used to approach 
conflict parties discussing, for instance, mine action-related conventions such as 
APMBC, CCM, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in the 
case of state actors and a Deed of Commitment (DoC) through Geneva Call in the 
case of armed non-state actors (ANSAs). These first contacts can help establish a 
regular line of communication, which may subsequently serve to discuss the 
possibility of formally entering into a fully-fledged peace process. Parties’ 
commitments to not use certain weapons might then facilitate and prepare the 
inclusion of mine action into a final ceasefire and/or peace agreement. An example 
for this point is the Philippines, where the Government and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the 
Bangsamoro (CAB) on 27 March 2014 and the MILF had previously signed a DoC 
(see box 2). 
Box 2: Philippines 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) was reached 
between the Government and MILF on 27 March 2014. The peace process that 
led to this agreement began on 15 October 2012 with the Framework Agreement 
on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and is meant to be completed in 2016 with the 
establishment of a new self-government political entity replacing the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) created in 1989 as an evolution from the 
Tripoli Agreement (1976).1 The CAB includes the FAB as an annex on normalisation, 
which encompasses specific measures concerning mine action. The normalisation 
refers to a process leading the communities to “achieve their desired quality of life, 
which includes sustainable livelihood and political participation within a peaceful 
deliberative society.” The annex on normalisation encompasses dispositions for 
mines/ERW. It recalls the DoC2 on APM signed by MILF on 7 April 2002 and states 
the commitment to clearance and MRE as part of the normalisation process.
1 Anton Chan, “’Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro’ – a Road map to Peace in the Southern 
Philippines?”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, vol. 6, issue 3, April 2014, p. 25.
2 Annex on Normalisation, 2014, pp. 6-7. See: http://peacemaker.un.org/document-search?keys=a
nnex+normalization&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=2014&field_pacountry_
tid=Philippines&=Search+Peace+Agreements (accessed 26 June 2015).
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MINE ACTION IN CEASEFIRE AND PEACE AGREEMENTS
As soon as mine action is talked about in a long-term framework, the activities 
entailed will change considerably. They will encompass clearing of mine-affected 
territory throughout a country with monitoring mechanisms and several other 
components that will outlast the signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement. So 
while CBMs on a relatively small scale are rather straightforward and manageable 
in terms of operations, the design of comprehensive mine action programmes 
is a tremendous challenge and clearly a question of content. Those programmes 
require the establishment of some form of institutional framework and therefore 
need to be negotiated and agreed upon in writing by the conflict parties if they 
are to be implemented. Accordingly, ceasefire45 and peace agreements are more 
likely to contain provisions aiming at comprehensive demining as opposed to 
shorter-term CBMs. CBMs, on the other hand, are more likely to be negotiated 
and implemented on the side, not necessarily reflected in a written ceasefire or 
peace agreement.      
The above-mentioned guidelines of the UN Inter-Agency Coordination Group 
on Mine Action (IACG-MA) suggest concrete steps on how to incorporate mine 
action into negotiations and agreements. In this connection, the concern of the 
interviewees for this issue brief was with the lack of expertise and information 
during mediation processes that would hamper precise discussions and clear 
commitment to the different mine action activities that are recommended by the 
guidelines. 
Furthermore, and especially in long-running conflicts, it is far from realistic to 
believe that accurate information on where mines/ERW have been laid will be 
available at the time of the negotiations. In many cases, mines/ERW will have 
moved during heavy rain or floods and those who laid them may have been 
killed during combat. Moreover, many countries will not have sufficient numbers 
of people trained for demining activities. Thus, in many cases mine action does 
not only suffer from a lack of will from the parties but also from the shortage of 
knowledge and expertise. 
45 It is noteworthy that not all ceasefire agreements are alike. Most importantly, they may be signed at 
different stages of a peace process and thus be of a permanent or only preliminary nature. This should 
also have an impact on how mine action would be taken into account. However, for this issue brief the 
authors have not made a distinction between various forms of ceasefires, recognizing that it may be 
advisable to do so in further research.
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Under these circumstances, the development of a fully-fledged mine action 
programme to be written into a document is neither sensible nor feasible. 
Therefore, mainly the mediation experts consulted for this study advocated for a 
humble but strategic approach to the issue of mines/ERW. They argued to focus on 
a set of questions and determine those actors who will be responsible for certain 
steps to be taken. This should ensure that a skeleton of a mine action programme 
exists but details will be negotiated after a peace agreement is signed. 
Such a strategic approach would allow setting not only the basis for a mine 
action programme, but also to connect it to other components and issues dealt 
with in the agreement, in particular to DDR programmes. Many interviewees 
emphasized that mine action can be a useful tool for the reintegration of former 
combatants into civilian life. Being trained as a deminer may be a good way to 
utilize the skills of those individuals in the interest of society at large while 
providing the demobilised people with a new livelihood. An example of where 
this was done successfully is Afghanistan46. Beyond this, it may be worthwhile to 
explore interlinkages with other security-related topics. Not treating mine action 
in isolation but instead putting it in the context of larger questions can have the 
benefit of coordinating respective activities with other efforts and using potential 
synergies. This being said, there may not always be the room and potential to do 
so, which is why every case must be analysed in its own right. 
46 GICHD, Mine Action and Armed Violence Reduction. HALO Trust’s Reintegration of Former Combatants 
into Demining. Afghanistan case study, Geneva, GICHD, 2012.
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CONCLUSION
Part I of this issue brief demonstrates that mine action is discussed and included in 
mediation, but this link is neither self-evident nor without challenges. Humanitarian 
demining can support peacemaking and peacebuilding, but this requires mine 
action to adapt and more specifically to integrate a political dimension which may 
be problematic from the perspective of humanitarian principles. The review of the 
agreements also revealed frequent reference to mine action provisions, but these 
are not as common and comprehensive as called for in the UN guidelines.
Interviews conducted for part II largely reflected the first findings. In fact, even 
though addressing the problem of mines/ERW within mediation processes may 
seem like a technical issue at first sight, the interviews conducted confirmed 
that it is indeed a challenge of significant importance and, in addition, an under-
explored topic in the field of peacemaking and peacebuilding.
In a nutshell, there are four recommendations for linking mine action and 
mediation that stand out. 
1. Discuss mine action in mediation:
The importance of discussing mine action in peace mediation and its potential as 
a confidence building measure was emphasised by all interviewees. We therefore 
consider it important that mediators promote this issue and discuss it with conflict 
parties, and that a conscious choice on opportunities and challenges of addressing 
mines/ERW be made. This does not always have to result in the formal inclusion 
of mine action in peace negotiations. When negotiations are blocked, it may be 
wiser to opt for a parallel negotiation track specifically focused on mines/ERW. It 
thus cannot be emphasised enough how important it is to conduct a case by case 
analysis when it comes to including mine action into formal mediation processes. 
The first part of this issue brief shows that mine action can contribute to 
peacemaking. However, practitioners should be aware of the fact that the 
humanitarian origin of mine action does not naturally match the political 
perspective inherent to a mediation process. As such, a distinction must be made 
between awareness raising and advocacy, of which only the former lies within 
the responsibilities of mediators. This entails bringing up the topic and providing 
experts who can deliver technical information. When it comes to advocacy in 
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favour of conventions and DoC, this should be left to other actors. Even though 
such efforts can promote the commitment of mine action and possibly be an entry 
point for negotiations or strengthen confidence, lobbying conflict parties bears the 
risk for mediators to lose their legitimacy and credibility as impartial interlocutors.    
2. Differentiate mine action before and after an agreement:
Another important finding of the research is that mine action is commonly referred 
to in two distinct cases of circumstances, with very different implications. The 
issue of mines/ERW is either addressed within a short timeframe through CBMs 
or with a long-term perspective through comprehensive mine action programmes. 
One may also argue that the issue is either taken up as an aspect of process or 
content. However, practitioners rarely explicitly distinguish between the two. This 
is problematic due to the very different nature of those two types of mine action. 
CBMs usually serve as tools to advance an overall peace process and to establish 
cooperation in a conflict environment on a clearly delineated field of activity. In 
that sense, demining activities are used as a means to different ends. They are an 
instrument to build confidence not only amongst the conflict parties themselves 
and towards the mediation process, but also the confidence of the local 
communities involved in the peace process. Similarly, discussions concerning 
mine action in general and related conventions/commitments specifically can 
provide an entry point to establish channels of communication with conflict 
parties. In the search for a primary engagement to explore opportunities for 
formal peace talks, mine action can thus serve as a first topic to be raised with 
parties. Consequently, mine action activities in this framework are determined by 
the needs of the mediation process and less by a humanitarian approach, clearly 
becoming a political tool.
In contrast, fully-fledged mine action programmes directly aiming to clear national 
territories from mines/ERW should consequently contribute to peacebuilding at 
large through the content of written agreements. 
These two forms of mine action are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are 
sometimes pursued in parallel, as is the case in Colombia. While mine action has 
been conducted as a CBM, discussions are ongoing to agree on the course the 
country will adopt in dealing with mines/ERW on a national level. This being said, 
mediators and mine action practitioners must be clear on the differences between 
the two. First and foremost, the different timeframes warrant a distinct strategic 
approach. Moreover, mine action as an entry point or as a CBM would be part 
of a mediation strategy whereas a mine action programme is the outcome of 
negotiations concerning a concrete agenda item during a peace process. 
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3. Incorporate the basic questions into the agreement: 
The analysis of agreements showed the difficulty to clearly and conclusively 
define the mine action activities to be undertaken as part of the implementation 
of a ceasefire or peace agreement. Agreements define broad lines of action that 
will be discussed and refined in more details once the implementation phase has 
started. For this reason, it is also important to consider establishing joint bodies, 
even with international missions, in charge of designing and steering mine action 
programmes once a peace negotiation has been concluded.
More specifically, the following five questions were suggested as the basis for the 
establishment of a functioning mine action programme:
 • What has to be done?
 • Who is responsible for what?
 • When does it have to be done?
 • Where will the funding come from?
 • How will the demining activities be monitored?
The absence of a reference to mine action in a ceasefire or peace agreement does 
not necessarily mean the topic itself has not come up during a peace process. 
As discussed, it may well have been used in a process-related manner. Thus, a 
thorough assessment of where mine action has served as an entry point or has 
been discussed in relation to CBMs, would warrant an analysis of the processes 
leading to agreements and not merely the resulting documents. However, it was 
not feasible to treat this topic within this issue brief’s scope. This would be an 
interesting area for further research. 
On a similar note, a better distinction should be made between ceasefire and 
peace agreements. The UN guidelines do not separate the two and provide a set 
of recommendations to be applied to both types of agreements. However, this 
issue brief has clearly identified that mine action can be conceived as part of either 
a process or the content of agreements. From this perspective, it is important 
to bear in mind that ceasefire agreements are often only a step of an ongoing 
process, which ideally leads to more comprehensive negotiations, whereas a 
peace agreement is ordinarily the end of it. Therefore, mine action in a ceasefire 
agreement could be interpreted as an instrument for confidence building rather 
than defining a comprehensive programme for humanitarian demining. A better 
differentiation between the recommendations for ceasefire or those for peace 
agreements could be another avenue for further research on the topic.
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4. Foster interaction between mine action and mediation communities: 
All consulted experts identified the lack of expertise and knowledge of mine 
action as an obstacle in peace processes. Consequently, there is a need for 
exchange and dialogue between mediation and mine action practitioners, sharing 
experiences and exploring synergies. While mediators and conflict parties 
alike seem to be struggling with the technical nature of mine action during 
peace processes, representatives from demining organizations could bring the 
know-how and experience to the table. Besides supporting mediators, these 
representatives could provide conflict parties with a realistic assessment of their 
country’s situation when it comes to mines/ERW. On the other hand, demining 
operators would benefit from a better understanding of mine action’s political 
implications and thus engaging with mediation practitioners. This would allow the 
demining operators to adapt their activities to the context and avoid potential risks 
they may otherwise be unaware of. 
However, when asked about the exchange taking place between representatives 
of the mine action and the mediation communities, respectively, all experts 
revealed that there is virtually no contact whatsoever. This issue brief thus strongly 
recommends a more strategic cooperation among these two fields of practice. 
Especially during the initial phase of a mediation process where strategies are 
designed and entry points are identified, an exchange about the situation of 
mines/ERW in a given context is advisable if not imperative. 
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ANNEXES
ANNEX I - UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION GUIDELINES 
FOR CEASEFIRE AND PEACE AGREEMENTS
Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action’s guidelines: 47
Background
1. In countries and regions emerging from violent conflict, mine action is often a 
prerequisite to the return of refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs), 
humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development. It is therefore of critical 
importance that ceasefire agreements and peace accords properly address 
mine action concerns and provide an appropriate framework for the effective 
initiation and implementation of mine action activities.
2. Too often in the past, essential mine-related issues have either not been 
addressed at all in cease-fire agreements and peace accords, or addressed 
too late and inadequately. In the worst cases, they have been addressed in 
a way that did not take account of technical realities and raised unrealistic 
expectations, delaying the establishment of proper and effective mechanisms 
for the implementation of mine action programmes.
Objective
3. This paper has been prepared to provide guidance to governments, 
organizations, and individuals involved in the negotiation and drafting of 
cease-fire agreements and peace accords. It aims to make them aware of the 
mine action concerns that need to be addressed, or at least considered, in 
such documents, and to help them draft appropriate references and clauses 
related to mine action.
47 Source: LeBrun, Emile, Damman Suzanne, “Addressing explosive ordnance in peace processes”, op. 
cit, pp. 25-26.
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Key mine-related concerns to be addressed
4. In situations where landmines are a significant obstacle to the resumption 
of normal life and reconstruction, cease-fire agreements and peace accords 
should consider and address seven sets of core mine action activities, related 
to: 
 • The exchange of technical information between all former parties to the 
conflict 
 • The marking of minefields and the eventual clearance of mines and UXO 
 • Mine risk education 
 • Victim assistance
 • Eliminating the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of mines 
 • Stockpile destruction 
 • International cooperation and coordination.
Exchange of technical information
5. The parties to the conflict should commit themselves to exchanging all 
technical information required for the identification, location, marking and 
eventual clearance of mines, minefields and UXO. The technical information 
required should conform to the technical annex of Amended Protocol 
Two of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) that is 
attached at annex two to this document, and should include maps and 
information regarding the specific types of unexploded ordnance that 
could be encountered. The parties should assist with the interpretation of 
the information exchanged, codes and symbols used in maps and other 
documents in particular, as well as their translation when required.
6. The agreements may designate the Secretary General of the United Nations, 
or another intermediary, to serve as the receiver of such information and 
facilitate the exchange process. Realistic deadlines should be set for the 
completion of the exchange of the information.
7. In many cases the available information may not be sufficient to allow for 
the safe implementation of mine clearance activities and survey operations 
will have to be conducted. In such instances the parties should commit 
themselves to facilitating unimpeded access to survey teams including flights 
for the purposes of aerial photography.
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Minefield marking and mine and UXO clearance
8. The parties to the conflict should commit themselves to actively supporting 
the identification, marking and eventual clearance of all minefields and 
UXO. Clear and realistic responsibilities and timelines should be defined in 
this regard, taking into consideration the technical capacities of the parties 
involved, and the need to ensure that operations are conducted effectively 
and safely, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS). All marking and clearance activities should be reported to the 
designated mine action authorities.
Mine Risk Education
9. The parties to the conflict should commit themselves to actively identifying 
those people who are most at risk of suffering mine or UXO accidents 
and support the prompt development of Mine Risk Education (MRE) 
programmes, which seek to prevent or reduce occurrences of related 
deaths and injuries. MRE programmes should be undertaken within a 
rights-based framework, which recognizes the legal and moral obligation and 
accountability of states to the rights and needs of their peoples. Accordingly, 
MRE programmes should be integrated with appropriate peace-building 
activities.
Victim assistance
10. The parties should commit themselves to providing assistance for the care 
and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims.
The use, production, transfer and stockpiling 
of antipersonnel mines
11. The parties to the accord should commit themselves to immediately 
stopping the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of mines, especially 
antipersonnel mines. For governments, this commitment should involve 
ratification of, or accession to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention, 
attached at annex three. For Non State Actors, this could involve signing the 
“Deed of Commitment” deposited with the Government of the Republic and 
Canton of Geneva, attached at annex four.
Stockpile destruction
12. The parties to the conflict should commit themselves to the total destruction 
of all stockpiles of landmines, antipersonnel mines in particular, under their 
possession or control. Realistic deadlines for the destruction of stockpiles 
should be contained in the peace accord or cease-fire agreement. Stockpile 
destruction operations should respect all relevant IMAS.
Annexes36
International cooperation and coordination
13. The parties to the conflict should normally commit themselves to inviting 
international cooperation for mine action. When necessary, the parties 
should agree to request international assistance through the United Nations 
or other organizations, to facilitate the safe and timely conduct of all mine 
action activities, in particular during the initial implementation phase of the 
agreement.
14. The parties should be encouraged to conduct mine action activities in 
response to clear humanitarian and socio economic needs so that priority is 
given to the most vulnerable.
Note: These guidelines have been endorsed by the Inter Agency Coordination 
Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA), which comprises the following UN bodies, 
DPKO, DDA, OCHA, FAO, OHCHR, UNDP, UNHCHR, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, WFP, WHO, and the 
World Bank.
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ANNEX II - QUESTIONNAIRE
Interview questions
1. How often would you say are issues linked to mines/ERW and mine action, 
addressed within a mediation process? And how frequently do agreements 
contain provisions for mine action?
2. In your experience, what are crucial aspects within a mediation process that 
make mine action a topic? Does it depend on certain actors, circumstances, 
timing, etc.?
3. Do you see linkages between questions related to mines/ERW and other 
topics discussed during a mediation process? If so what are they and how do 
they manifest themselves?
4. In contexts where mines/ERW are an issue, would you advocate for its 
inclusion in a mediation process or would you rather treat it as a technical 
endeavour on the side?
5. Have you ever experienced reluctance by any of the actors involved in a 
peace process to include mine action? If so, what were the reasons for the 
reservations?
6. What has been the most successful strategy in your experience to address 
mine action within a larger peace process (not limited to the mediation 
process)?
7. How could the inclusion of long-term mine action engagements be 
sequenced? What should be discussed at the peace table and when?
8. Is there anything you would like to add?
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ANNEX III - LIST OF AGREEMENTS
# Agreements/documents Date of the agreement Country/Entity
1
Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice 
Agreement 23 March 1949 Lebanon, Israel
2 General Armistice Agreement 20 July 1949 Israel, Syria
3
Hashemite Jordan Kingdom-Israel: 
General Armistice 03 April 1949 Israel, Jordan
4
Peace Treaty Between the State of Israel 
and the Arab Republic of Egypt 26 March 1979 Israel, Egypt
5
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities 
(i.e. 'Geneva Agreements') 20 July 1954
Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Vietnam
6
Definitive ceasefire agreement between 
the Government of the Republic of 
Nicaragua and the “Yatama” Atlantic Front 
of Nicaraguan Resistance
18 April 1990 Nicaragua
7
Framework for a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict (i.e. 
"the Paris Agreement")
23 October 1991 Cambodia
8
General Peace Agreement for 
Mozambique 04 October 1992 Mozambique
9
Protocol of Negotiations between the 
Governmental Delegations of the Republic 
of Georgia and the Russian Federation
09 April 1993 Georgia, Russia
10
Agreement for the Demilitarisation of 
Srebrenica 18 April 1993 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
11 Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 29 March 1994 Croatia
12 Lusaka Protocol 15 November 1994 Angola
13
General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e. 'Dayton 
Agreement')
21 November 1995
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia 
14
Agreement on the Implementation, 
Compliance and Verification Timetable for 
the Peace Agreements
29 December 1996 Guatemala
15
Sudan Peace Agreement (i.e. Khartoum 
Agreement) 21 April 1997 Sudan
16
Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-
Government in Kosovo (i.e. 'Rambouillet 
Accords')
23 February 1999 Kosovo, Serbia
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# Agreements/documents Date of the agreement Country/Entity
17
Military Technical Agreement Between the 
International Security Force (KFOR) and 
the Governments of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia
09 June 1999 Kosovo, Serbia
18
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 
(1999) on the Situation Relating to Kosovo 10 June 1999 Kosovo
19
Undertaking of Demilitarisation and 
Transformation by the UCK (i.e. Kosovo 
Liberation Army, KLA)
20 June 1999 Kosovo
20
Peace Agreement between the 
Government of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 
(RUF/SL) ('the Lomé Peace Agreement')
07 July 1999 Sierra Leone
21
Technical Arrangements for the 
Implementation of the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) Framework 
Agreement
31 August 1999 Ethiopia, Eritrea
22
Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities 
between the Government of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the 
Government of the State of Eritrea
19 June 2000 Ethiopia, Eritrea
23
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi 28 August 2000 Burundi
24
Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement 
on Sudan 19 January 2002 Sudan
25
Ceasefire Agreement between the 
Transitional Government of Burundi and 
the Conseil National pour la Défense de la 
Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la 
Démocratie (CNDD-FDD)
02 December 2002 Burundi
26
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the 
Conflict in Darfur 02 April 2004 Sudan
27
Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Peace, 
Security, Democracy and Development in 
the Great Lakes Region
20 November 2004
Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, 
Republic of Congo, 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia
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# Agreements/documents Date of the agreement Country/Entity
28
Zinguinchor Peace Agreement between 
Government of Senegal and the 
Movement of the Democratic Forces of 
Casamance (MFDC)
30 December 2004 Senegal
29
Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and 
Security Arrangements Implementation 
Modalities between the Government 
of the Sudan and the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement/Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (SPLM/A) during the Pre-
Interim and Interim Periods
31 December 2004 Sudan, South Sudan
30
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
between the Government of the Republic 
of the Sudan and the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement/Sudan People's 
Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA)
09 January 2005 Sudan, South Sudan 
31
Comprehensive Peace Accord signed 
between the Nepal Government and the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
22 November 2006 Nepal
32
Agreement on the Monitoring of the 
Management of Arms and Armies 08 December 2006 Nepal
33
Comprehensive Agreement on the 
Bangsamoro 27 March 2014 The Philippines
34
Agreement on the Resolution of the 
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan 17 August 2015 South Sudan
35
The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement 
between the Government of the Republic 
of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic 
Armed Organisations
15 October 2015 Myanmar
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANSAs  
Armed non-state 
actors 
APM  
Anti-personnel mines
APMBC  
Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention 
ARMM  
Autonomous Region 
of Muslim Mindanao 
AVM  
Anti-vehicle mines
CAB  
Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement on the 
Bangsamoro 
CBM  
Confidence Building 
Measure
CCM  
Convention on Cluster 
Munition 
CCW  
Convention on 
Certain Conventional 
Weapons
CM  
Cluster munitions
CNAMS  
Senegalese National 
Mine Action Centre 
DDR  
Disarmament, 
demobilisation and 
rehabilitation
DoC  
Deed of Commitment
ERW  
Explosive remnants of 
war 
FAB  
Framework 
Agreement on the 
Bangsamoro 
FARC-EP  
Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia
HD  
Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue 
IACG-MA 
Inter-Agency 
Coordination Group 
on Mine Action 
ICBL  
International 
Campaign to Ban 
Landmines 
IDP  
Internally displaced 
people 
IED  
Improvised explosive 
device
IFOR  
Implementation Force 
IMAS  
International Mine 
Action Standards 
INGO  
International non-
governmental 
organisation
KFOR  
Kosovo Force 
MFDC  
Movement of 
Democratic Forces of 
Casamance 
MILF  
Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front 
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MRE  
Mine risk education
NGO  
Non-governmental 
organisation
OSCE   
Organization for 
Security and  
Co-operation in 
Europe 
SSR  
Security sector reform
swisspeace 
Swiss Peace 
Foundation
UN  
United Nations
UNMAS  
United Nations Mine 
Action Service
UNPROFOR  
United Nations 
Protection Force 
UNSG  
Secretary-General of 
the United Nations 
URNG  
Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unit 
UXO  
Unexploded ordnance 
VA  
Victim assistance 
Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining 
Maison de la paix, Tower 3 
Chemin Eugène-Rigot 2C 
PO Box 1300 
CH – 1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland 
info@gichd.org
Follow us on
gichd.org 
facebook 
twitter 
linkedin 
youtube
